The Obama Administration - Military Policy

The Obama Administration - Military Policy

Barack Obama was supposed to bring an outstandingly new approach to American politics and to address ably all the problems affecting the country. A major advantage was that he was not George W. Bush. After about five months in office, perhaps it’s time to ruminate a bit on what seems to be happening. I will be posting comments on the Obama military policy, its diplomatic policy and key aspects of it domestic policies, including industrial, health, environmental and financial.

In military policy, the topic that most outraged Democratic liberals, it is difficult to discern much difference between the Obama and Bush approaches. Troops are being withdrawn from Iraq, but slowly and as many as 50,000 may remain for some time. There is also a real chance that should things deteriorate more than feared, US policy may reverse and troop withdrawals cease.

In Afghanistan, the Obama administration has moved to deepen US involvement, adding more troops and acknowledging the tight connection between Pashtun radicals in Afghanistan and their cousins in Pakistan. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever been a true nation state. Afghanistan has been the collection of disparate ethnic groups put offside by the British, who having been badly beaten there in the 1840’s, drew a line (the Durand Line) down the middle of the mountains and chose only to administer, albeit lightly, those on the east side of the line. Those west of the line were cobbled together by a series of strong men into a kingdom in which central authority and modernization were both quite limited. Pakistan was created artificially by the British in 1946 to provide a home for India’s muslims after independence. Bengal in the east, the Punjab and Sindh in the west formed the heartland with Baluchistan, the north-west territories and Kashmir as the appendages. India favored the Hindu ruler of Kashmir and the partition of that territory left most of its muslim inhabitants under Indian rule. The east Bengalis resented control from the Punjabis and in 1977, with a bit of help from India, achieved independence as Bangla Desh, noted for poverty and flooding. Pakistan itself has not been overly successful in alleviating poverty or in modernization.

So now we have a weak and corrupt central government in Afghanistan and up to now too few American and other foreign troops engaged to subdue the radical Islamic resistance. The major export appears to be opium, the trade in which we know is quite profitable and funds all sorts of mischief. President Obama has taken over the Afghan campaign as his own, moving many of the key people who served Bush in Iraq into this theatre. Afghanistan’s terrain is far more difficult than that of Iraq and much of the equipment developed for the Iraqi desert works poorly in the Afghan mountains. There is now a debate under way within the US Army as to the proper strategy. Do we concentrate on protecting civilian population centers, abandoning as it were the scattered guerrillas in the remote crags and valleys, or do we attack all the resisters in the hope that this will prevent attacks on towns and villages. I believe it is acknowledged that to win will require gaining the support of a large majority of the people.

Pakistan is beginning to confront the reality that it’s mortal enemy is not, as has been believed since 1946, India, but the intransigent Islamic radicals within its midst, concentrated at present in the north-west territories. Pakistan’s army appears to have the capacity to push the Taliban out of relatively accessible places like the Swat Valley, but the truly rugged terrain of Waziristan in which the radicals have been entrenched for decades, may prove far more difficult. There is a real question as to whether Pakistan has sufficient national will to endure a long and difficult campaign and whether it can survive its dysfunctional political system.

The Bush administration got rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan, at least initially, but devoted insufficient resources to keep everything under control. It also provided substantial aid to Musharraf's Pakistani government, but with modest results. There is now a "democratic" government in Pakistan but how secure is unclear. Into this situation the Obama administration appears willing to add resources but positive results are anything but assured. And if things don’t go well, how long will the American public put up with an apparently never ending war for a country far away?

Beyond Central Asia, US military power appears to be challenged only in East Asia. As China continues to grow economically and to assert its interests, the relationship between the US and its allies, such as Japan, and China becomes trickier. What are China’s objectives and do they conflict with ours? How do these two major powers develop a working relationship that doesn’t threaten to result in military conflict?

North Korea in its current very belligerent mode would appear to be a military threat. South Korea looks to the US to be its nuclear shield and to protect it against any aggression from the north. The US has 28,000 troops in country and they could be at risk. Japan’s national interest is also threatened and that country may well become more militant if it perceives a need to defend itself under circumstances where the US doesn’t seem sufficiently firm or committed. What does seem to be the driving force within North Korea is instability in the hold of the ruling family and close associates on what is clearly a failed state. Instability and fear can lead to unfortunate accidents, but on balance North Korea is not a major military force. But its aggression if not checked could bring on a very messy and destructive conflict.

On the home front, Defense Secretary Gates is developing what I think is an intelligent reshaping of the US military force. We need to look at real potential enemies, mostly lightly armed forces that engage in asymmetrical warfare and for which huge nuclear powered destroyers and very expensive jet fighters are of modest use.

Whether these changes can be brought about is a true challenge to the Obama Administration. The enemies are the 535 defense micro-managers on Capitol Hill who have clearly shown that their interest is not nearlys as much the national interest but rather how much money and how many jobs can be squeezed out of the DOD budget for each district. They are joined in this by the career military officers who are emotionally tied to big and better airplanes, bigger and better ships and more and more complex weaponry. Behind them come the large - and many small - corporations that live off defense procurement as it now is. Cutting production of F-22’s and building something else portends wrenching realignments of the players, a situation they would like to avoid if at all possible. I don’t see much of an Obama commitment to military reorganization, certainly not enough to alienate Congress people who hold Obama’s plans for health and environmental reform in their hands. And so I don’t see Mr. Gates’ programs going very far.